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Abstract. Discounted-sum games provide a formal model for the study
of reinforcement learning, where the agent is enticed to get rewards early
since later rewards are discounted. When the agent interacts with the en-
vironment, she may regret her actions, realizing that a previous choice
was suboptimal given the behavior of the environment. The main contri-
bution of this paper is a PSpace algorithm for computing the minimum
possible regret of a given game. To this end, several results of indepen-
dent interest are shown. (1) We identify a class of regret-minimizing and
admissible strategies that first assume that the environment is collabo-
rating, then assume it is adversarial—the precise timing of the switch is
key here. (2) Disregarding the computational cost of numerical analysis,
we provide an NP algorithm that checks that the regret entailed by a
given time-switching strategy exceeds a given value. (3) We show that
determining whether a strategy minimizes regret is decidable in PSpace.
Keywords: Admissibility · Discounted-sum games · Regret minimization
1 Introduction
A pervasive model used to study the strategies of an agent in an unknown en-
vironment is two-player infinite horizon games played on finite weighted graphs.
Therein, the set of vertices of a graph is split between two players, Adam and
Eve, playing the roles of the environment and the agent, respectively. The play
starts in a specific vertex, and each player decides where to go next when the
play reaches one of their vertices. Questions asked about these games are usually
of the form: Does there exist a strategy of Eve such that. . . ? For such a question
to be well-formed, one should provide:
1. A valuation function: given an infinite play, what is Eve’s reward?
2. Assumptions about the environment: is Adam trying to help or hinder Eve?
The valuation function can be Boolean, in which case one says that Eve
wins or loses (one very classical example has Eve winning if the maximum value
appearing infinitely often along the edges is even). In this setting, it is often
assumed that Adam is adversarial, and the question then becomes: Can Eve
always win? (The names of the players stem from this view: is there a strategy
of ∃ve that always beats ∀dam?) The literature on that subject spans more than
35 years, with newly found applications to this day (see [3] for comprehensive
lecture notes, and [7] for an example of recent use in the analysis of attacks in
cryptocurrencies).
The valuation function can also aggregate the numerical values along the
edges into a reward value. We focus in this paper on discounted sum: if w is
the weight of the edge taken at the n-th step, Eve’s reward grows by λn · w,
where λ ∈ (0, 1) is a prescribed discount factor. Discounting future rewards is a
classical notion used in economics [18], Markov decision processes [16,9], systems
theory [8], and is at the heart of Q-learning, a reinforcement learning technique
widely used in machine learning [19]. In this setting, we consider three attitudes
towards the environment:
1. The adversarial environment hypothesis translates to Adam trying to min-
imize Eve’s reward, and the question becomes: Can Eve always achieve a
reward of x? This problem is in NP ∩ coNP [20] and showing a P upper-
bound would constitute a major breakthrough (namely, it would imply the
same for so-called parity games [15]). A strategy of Eve that maximizes
her rewards against an adversarial environment is called worst-case optimal.
Conversely, a strategy that maximizes her rewards assuming a collaborative
environment is called best-case optimal.
2. Assuming that the environment is adversarial is drastic, if not pessimistic.
Eve could rather be interested in settling for a strategy σ which is not consis-
tently bad: if another strategy σ′ gives a better reward in one environment,
there should be another environment for which σ is better than σ′. Such
strategies, called admissible [5], can be seen as an a priori rational choice.
3. Finally, Eve could put no assumption on the environment, but regret not
having done so. Formally, the regret value of Eve’s strategy is defined as
the maximal difference, for all environments, between the best value Eve
could have obtained and the value she actually obtained. Eve can thus be
interested in following a strategy that achieves the minimal regret value,
aptly called a regret-minimal strategy [10]. This constitutes an a posteri-
ori rational choice [12]. Regret-minimal strategies were explored in several
contexts, with applications including competitive online algorithm synthesis
and robot-motion planning [2,11,13,14].
In this paper, we single out a class of strategies for Eve that first follow a
best-case optimal strategy, then switch to a worst-case optimal strategy after
some precise time; we call these strategies optipess. Our main contributions are
then:
1. Optipess strategies are not only regret-minimal (a fact established in [13])
but also admissible—note that there are regret-minimal strategies that are
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not admissible and vice versa (see Appendix). On the way, we show that for
any strategy of Eve there is an admissible strategy that performs at least as
well; this is a peculiarity of discounted-sum games.
2. The regret value of a given time-switching strategy can be computed with
an NP algorithm (disregarding the cost of numerical analysis). The main
technical hurdle is showing that exponentially long paths can be represented
succinctly, a result of independent interest.
3. The question Can Eve’s regret be bounded by x? is decidable in NPcoNP,
improving on the implicit NExp algorithm of [13]. The algorithm consists
in guessing a time-switching strategy and computing its regret value; since
optipess strategies are time-switching strategies that are regret-minimal, the
algorithm will eventually find the minimal regret value of the input game.
Notations and definitions are introduced in Section 2. The study of admis-
sible regret-minimal strategies is done in Section 3. In Section 4, we provide an
important lemma that allows to represent long paths succinctly. In Section 5, we
argue that the important values of a game (regret, best-case, worst-case) have
short witnesses. Finally, in Section 6, we rely on these lemmas to present our
new algorithms.
2 Preliminaries
We assume familiarity with basic graph and complexity theory. Some more spe-
cific definitions and known results are recalled here.
Game, play, history. A (discounted-sum) game G is a tuple (V, v0, V∃, E, w, λ)
where V is a finite set of vertices, v0 is the starting vertex, V∃ ⊆ V is the subset
of vertices that belong to Eve, E ⊆ V × V is a set of directed edges, w : E → Z
is an (edge-)weight function, and 0 < λ < 1 is a rational discount factor. The
vertices in V \ V∃ are said to belong to Adam. Since we consider games played
for an infinite number of turns, we will always assume that every vertex has at
least one outgoing edge.
A play is an infinite path v1v2 · · · ∈ V
ω in the digraph (V,E). A history
h = v1 · · · vn is a finite path. The length of h, written |h|, is the number of edges
it contains: |h|
def
= n − 1. The set Hist consists of all histories that start in v0
and end in a vertex from V∃.
Strategies. A strategy of Eve in G is a function σ that maps histories ending in
some vertex v ∈ V∃ to a neighbouring vertex v
′ (i.e., (v, v′) ∈ E). The strategy
σ is positional if for all histories h, h′ ending in the same vertex, σ(h) = σ(h′).
Strategies of Adam are defined similarly.
A history h = v1 · · · vn is said to be consistent with a strategy σ of Eve if for
all i ≥ 2 such that vi ∈ V∃, we have that σ(v1 · · · vi−1) = vi. Consistency with
strategies of Adam is defined similarly. We write Hist(σ) for the set of histories
in Hist that are consistent with σ. A play is consistent with a strategy (of either
player) if all its prefixes are consistent with it.
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Given a vertex v and both Adam and Eve’s strategies, τ and σ respectively,
there is a unique play starting in v that is consistent with both, called the
outcome of τ and σ on v. This play is denoted outv(σ, τ).
For a strategy σ of Eve and a history h ∈ Hist(σ), we let σh be the strategy
of Eve that assumes h has already been played. Formally, σh(h
′) = σ(h · h′) for
any history h′ (we will use this notation only on histories h′ that start with the
ending vertex of h).
Values. The value of a history h = v1 · · · vn is the discounted sum of the weights
on the edges:
Val(h)
def
=
|h|−1∑
i=0
λiw(vi, vi+1) .
The value of a play is simply the limit of the values of its prefixes.
The antagonistic value of a strategy σ of Eve with history h = v1 · · · vn is
the value Eve achieves when Adam tries to hinder her, after h:
aValh(σ)
def
= Val(h) + λ|h| · inf
τ
Val(outvn(σh, τ)) ,
where τ ranges over all strategies of Adam. The collaborative value cValh(σ)
is defined in a similar way, by substituting “sup” for “inf.” We write aValh
(resp. cValh) for the best antagonistic (resp. collaborative) value achievable by
Eve with any strategy.
Types of strategies. A strategy σ of Eve is strongly worst-case optimal (SWO)
if for every history h we have aValh(σ) = aValh; it is strongly best-case opti-
mal (SBO) if for every history h we have cValh(σ) = cValh.
We single out a class of SWO strategies that perform well if Adam turns out to
be helping. A SWO strategy σ of Eve is strongly best worst-case optimal (SBWO)
if for every history h we have cValh(σ) = acValh, where:
acValh
def
= sup{cValh(σ′) | σ′ is a SWO strategy of Eve} .
In the context of discounted-sum games, strategies that are positional and
strongly optimal always exist. Furthermore, the set of all such strategies can be
characterized by local conditions.
Lemma 1 (Follows from [20, Theorem 5.1]). There exist positional SWO,
SBO, and SBWO strategies in every game. For any positional strategy σ of Eve:
– (∀v ∈ V ) [aValv(σ) = aValv] iff σ is SWO;
– (∀v ∈ V ) [cValv(σ) = cValv] iff σ is SBO;
– (∀v ∈ V ) [aValv(σ) = aValv ∧ cValv(σ) = acValv] iff σ is SBWO.
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Regret. The regret of a strategy σ of Eve is the maximal difference between
the value obtained by using σ and the value obtained by using an alternative
strategy:
Reg (σ)
def
= sup
τ
((
sup
σ′
Val(outv0(σ′, τ))
)
−Val(outv0(σ, τ))
)
,
where τ and σ′ range over all strategies of Adam and Eve, respectively. The
(minimal) regret of G is then Reg
def
= infσReg (σ).
Regret can also be characterized by considering the point in history when
Eve should have done things differently. Formally, for any vertices u and v let
cValu¬v be the maximal cVal
u(σ) for strategies σ verifying σ(u) 6= v. Then:
Lemma 2 ([13, Lemma 13]). For all strategies σ of Eve:
Reg (σ) = sup
{
λn
(
cValvn¬σ(h) − aVal
vn(σh)
) ∣∣∣ h = v0 · · · vn ∈ Hist(σ)} .
Switching and optipess strategies. Given strategies σ1, σ2 of Eve and a threshold
function t : V∃ → N ∪ {∞}, we define the switching strategy σ1
t
→σ2 for any
history h = v1 · · · vn ending in V∃ as:
σ1
t
→σ2(h) =
{
σ2(h) if (∃i)[i ≥ t(vi)],
σ1(h) otherwise.
We refer to histories for which the first condition above holds as switched histo-
ries, to all others as unswitched histories. The strategy is said to be bipositional
if both σ1 and σ2 are positional. Note that in that case, if h is switched then σh =
σ2, and otherwise σh is the same as σ but with t(v) changed to max{0, t(v)−|h|}
for all v ∈ V∃. In particular, if |h| is greater than max{t(v) < ∞}, then σh is
nearly positional: it switches to σ2 as soon as it sees a vertex with t(v) 6=∞.
A strategy σ is perfectly optimistic-then-pessimistic (optipess, for short) if
there are positional SBO and SBWO strategies σsbo and σsbwo such that σ =
σsbo
t
→σsbwo where t(v) = inf
{
i ∈ N
∣∣ λi (cValv − aValv) ≤ Reg} .
Theorem 1 ([13]). For all optipess strategies σ of Eve, Reg (σ) = Reg.
For completeness, we give a simple proof of this result in Appendix.
As we have done so far, we will assume throughout the paper that a game G is
fixed—with the notable exception of the results on complexity.
⋆
⋆ ⋆
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Example 1. Consider the following game, where round vertices are owned by
Eve, and square ones by Adam. The double edges represent Eve’s positional
strategy σ:
v0
v1
v2
v′
1
v′′
1
v′
2
x y
0
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
2
00
1
Eve’s strategy has a regret value of 2λ2/(1 − λ). This is realized when Adam
plays from v0 to v1, from v
′′
1 to x, and from v
′
1 to y. Against that strategy, Eve
ensures a discounted-sum value of 0 by playing according to σ while regretting
not having played to v′′1 to obtain 2λ
2/(1− λ). 
3 Admissible strategies and regret
There is no reason for Eve to choose a strategy that is consistently worse than
another one. This classical notion is formalized as follows:
Definition 1. Let σ1, σ2 be two strategies of Eve. We say that σ1 is weakly
dominated by σ2 if Val(out
v0(σ1, τ)) ≤ Val(out
v0(σ2, τ)) for every strategy τ
of Adam. We say that σ1 is dominated by σ2 if σ1 is weakly dominated by σ2
but not conversely. A strategy σ of Eve is admissible if it is not dominated by
any other strategy.
Example 2. Consider the following game, where the strategy σ of Eve is shown
by the double edges:
v0
v1
v2
v′
1
v′′
1
v′
2
0
0
0
0
0
10
5
6
This strategy guarantees a discounted-sum value of 6λ2(1−λ) against any strat-
egy of Adam. Furthermore, it is worst-case optimal since playing to v1 instead
of v2 would allow Adam the opportunity to ensure a strictly smaller value by
playing to v′′1 . The latter also implies that σ is admissible. Interestingly, playing
to v1 is also an admissible behavior of Eve since, against a strategy of Adam
that plays from v1 to v
′
1, it obtains 10λ
2(1 − λ) > 6λ2(1 − λ). 
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In this section, we show that (1) Any strategy is weakly dominated by an
admissible strategy; (2) Being dominated entails more regret; (3) Optipess strate-
gies are both regret-minimal and admissible. We will need the following:
Lemma 3 ([6]). A strategy σ of Eve is admissible if and only if for every his-
tory h ∈ Hist(σ) the following holds: either cValh(σ) > aValh or aValh(σ) =
cValh(σ) = aValh = acValh.
The above characterization of admissible strategies in so-called well-formed
games was proved in [6, Theorem 11]. Lemma 3 follows from the fact that
discounted-sum games are well-formed (see Appendix, Section E).
3.1 Any strategy is weakly dominated by an admissible strategy
We show that discounted-sum games have the distinctive property that every
strategy is weakly dominated by an admissible strategy. This is in stark contrast
with most cases where admissibility has been studied previously [6].
Theorem 2. Any strategy of Eve is weakly dominated by an admissible strategy.
Proof (Sketch). The main idea is to construct, based on σ, a strategy σ′ that will
switch to a SBWO strategy as soon as σ does not satisfy the characterization
of Lemma 3. The first argument consists in showing that σ is indeed weakly
dominated by σ′. This is easily done by comparing, against each strategy τ of
Adam, the values of σ and σ′. The second argument consists in verifying that
σ′ is indeed admissible. This is done by checking that each history h consistent
with σ′ satisfies the characterization of Lemma 3, that is cValh(σ′) > aValh
or aValh(σ′) = cValh(σ′) = aValh = acValh. If σ′ is already following an
SBWO strategy at h, then the definition of SBWO strategies ensures that
aValh(σ′) = aValh and cValh(σ′) = acValh, and the part of the character-
ization satisfied only depends whether acValh > aValh. If σ′ is still following
σ at h, the reasoning relies on the facts that σ′ weakly dominates σ and that σ
satisfies the characterization of Lemma 3 until h. This is true because σ′ and σ
agree up to h. In the case where cValh(σ) > aValh, the weak dominance of σ
by σ′ implies that cValh(σ′) ≥ cValh(σ) and thus that cValh(σ′) > aValh. In
the case where aValh(σ) = cValh(σ) = aValh = acValh, the weak dominance
of σ by σ′ implies:
– first, that aValh(σ′) ≥ aValh(σ) and thus that aValh(σ′) = aValh,
– second, that cValh(σ′) ≥ cValh(σ) = acValh.
Since the first point shows that σ′ is worst-case optimal at h, we know, by defini-
tion of acValh, that cValh(σ′) ≤ acValh. Combined with the second point, we
get that cValh(σ′) = acValh and thus that aValh(σ′) = cValh(σ′) = aValh =
acValh. ⊓⊔
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3.2 Being dominated is regretful
Theorem 3. For all strategies σ, σ′ of Eve such that σ is weakly dominated by
σ′, it holds that Reg (σ′) ≤ Reg (σ).
Proof. Let σ, σ′ be such that σ is weakly dominated by σ′. This means that for
every strategy τ of Adam, we have that Val(π) ≤ Val(π′) where π = outv0(σ, τ)
and π′ = outv0(σ′, τ). Consequently, we obtain(
sup
σ′′
Val(outv0(σ′′, τ)
)
−Val(π′) ≤
(
sup
σ′′
Val(outv0(σ′′, τ)
)
−Val(π).
As this holds for any τ , we can conclude that supτ supσ′′(Val(out
v0(σ′′, τ)) −
Val(outv0(σ′, τ))) ≤ supτ supσ′′ (Val(out
v0(σ′′, τ)) −Val(outv0(σ, τ))), that is
Reg (σ′) ≤ Reg (σ). ⊓⊔
The converse of the lemma is however false.
3.3 Optipess strategies are both regret-minimal and admissible
Recall that there are admissible strategies that are not regret-minimal and vice
versa (see Appendix, Section A). However, as a direct consequence of Theorem 2
and Theorem 3, there always exist regret-minimal admissible strategies. It turns
out that optipess strategies, which are regret-minimal (Theorem 1), are also
admissible:
Theorem 4. All optipess strategies of Eve are admissible.
Proof. Let σsbo and σsbwo be positional SBO and SBWO strategies of Eve, σ
be an optipess strategy of Eve with σ = σsbo
t
→σsbwo, and let h = v0 . . . vn ∈
Hist(σ) be a history consistent with σ.
Suppose first that λk (cValvk − aValvk) ≤ Reg for some 0 ≤ k ≤ n. That is,
h is a switched history and therefore σ(h) = σsbwo(h) We know that σ will follow
σsbwo forever from h, thus we have cValh(σ) = cValh(σsbwo) and aValh(σ) =
aValh(σsbwo). Recall that cValh(σsbwo) = acValh. Hence, if acValh > aValh,
we have that cValh(σ) = cValh(σsbwo) = acValh > aValh, and σ satisfies the
first case of the characterization from Lemma 3. Now, if acValh = aValh, the
second case is satisfied: we have that cValh(σ) = acValh, and as aValh(σ) =
aValh(σsbwo), we also have that aValh(σ) = aValh since σsbwo is SWO.
Suppose now that Reg < λn (cValvk − aValvk) for all 0 ≤ k ≤ n. By def-
inition of optipess strategies, we know that σ and σsbo agree up to h, and,
in particular, that σ(h) = σsbo(h). Furthermore, we know that cValh > aValh,
otherwise at vn we have λ
n(cValvn−aValvn) = 0, which is necessarily smaller or
equal to Reg. Let us show that cValh(σ) > aValh, thus satisfying the first case
of the characterization. Assume, towards contradiction, that cValh(σ) ≤ aValh.
Let τ be a strategy of Adam such that h is consistent with the outcome of τ
and σ, and the value of the outcome of τ and σsbo is cValh. (Such strategy
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and outcome indeed exist because h is consistent with σsbo and discounted-sum
value functions are continuous, see Appendix E for more details.) By definition
of the regret, we have that Reg (σ) ≥ Val(outv0(σsbo, τ)) −Val(outv0(σ, τ)).
We already know that Val(outv0(σsbo, τ)) = cValh and Val(outv0(σ, τ)) ≤
cValh(σ) ≤ aValh. Thus, Val(outv0(σsbo, τ)) − Val(outv0(σ, τ)) ≥ cValh −
aValh, that is Reg (σ) ≥ cValh − aValh. On the other hand, since the strat-
egy σ is regret-minimizing, it holds that Reg (σ) = Reg. Hence, Reg (σ) <
λn (cValvn − aValvn). But we also have cValh−aValh = (Val(h)+λncValvn)−
(Val(h) + λnaValvn) = λn (cValvn − aValvn). We thus get a contradiction:
Reg (σ) < λn (cValvn − aValvn) and Reg (σ) ≥ λn (cValvn − aValvn). ⊓⊔
4 Minimal values are witnessed by a single iterated cycle
We start our technical work towards a better algorithm to compute the regret
value of a game. In this section, we show a crucial lemma on representing long
histories: there are histories of a simple shape that witness small values in the
game.
More specifically, we show that for any history h, there is another history h′ of
the same length that has smaller value and such that h′ = α ·βk ·γ where |αβγ| is
small. This will allow us to find the smallest possible value among exponentially
large histories by guessing α, β, γ, and k, which will all be small. This property
holds for a wealth of different valuation functions, hinting at possible further
applications. Namely, the only requirement is the following:
Lemma 4. For any history h = α · β · γ with α and γ same-length cycles:
min{Val(α2 · β),Val(β · γ2)} ≤ Val(h) .
Within the proof of the key lemma of this section, and later on when we use
it (Lemma 9), we will rely on the following elementary notion of cycle decompo-
sition:
Definition 2. A simple-cycle decomposition (SCD) is a pair consisting of paths
and iterated simple cycles. Formally, an SCD is a pair D = 〈(αi)
n
i=0, (βj , kj)
n
j=1〉,
where each αi is a path, each βj is a simple cycle, and each kj is a positive
integer. We write D(j) = β
kj
j · αj and D(⋆) = α0 ·D(1)D(2) · · ·D(n).
By carefully iterating Lemma 4, we have:
Lemma 5. For any history h there exists an history h′ = α · βk · γ with:
– h and h′ have the same starting and ending vertices, and the same length;
– Val(h′) ≤ Val(h),
– |αβγ| ≤ 4|V |3 and β is a simple cycle.
Proof. In this proof, we focus on SCDs for which each path αi is simple; we
call them ßCDs. We define a wellfounded partial order on ßCDs. Let D =
〈(αi)
n
i=0, (βj , kj)
n
j=1〉 and D
′ = 〈(α′i)
n′
i=0, (β
′
j , k
′
j)
n′
j=1〉 be two ßCDs; we write
D′ < D iff all the following holds:
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– D(⋆) and D′(⋆) have the same starting and ending vertices, the same length,
and satisfy Val(D′(⋆)) ≤ Val(D(⋆)) and n′ ≤ n;
– Either n′ < n, or |α′0 · · ·α
′
n′ | < |α0 · · ·αn|, or |{k
′
i ≥ |V |}| < |{ki ≥ |V |}|.
That this order has no infinite descending chain is clear. We show two claims:
1. Any ßCD with n greater than |V | has a smaller ßCD;
2. Any ßCD with two kj , kj′ > |V | has a smaller ßCD.
Together they imply that for a smallest ßCD D, D(⋆) is of the required form.
Indeed let j be the unique value for which kj > |V |, then the statement of the
Lemma is satisfied by letting α = α0 · D(1) · · ·D(j − 1), β = βj , k = kj , and
γ = αj ·D(j + 1) · · ·D(n).
Claim 1. Suppose D has n > |V |. Since all cycles are simple, there are
two cycles βj, βj′ , j < j
′, of same length. We can apply Lemma 4 on the path
βj · (αjD(j + 1) · · ·D(j
′ − 1)) · βj′ , and remove one of the two cycles while
duplicating the other; we thus obtain a similar path of smaller value. This can
be done repeatedly until we obtain a path with only one of the two cycles, say
βj′ , the other case being similar. Substituting this path in D(⋆) results in:
α0 ·D(1) · · ·D(j) ·
(
αj ·D(j + 1) · · ·D(j
′ − 1) · β
kj+kj′
j′
)
·αj′ ·D(j
′+1) · · ·D(n) .
This gives rise to a smaller ßCD as follows. If αj−1αj is still a simple path,
then the above history is expressible as an ßCD with a smaller number of cycles.
Otherwise, we rewrite αj−1αj = α
′
j−1β
′
jα
′
j where α
′
j−1 and α
′
j are simple paths
and β′j is a simple cycle; since |α
′
j−1α
′
j | < |αj−1αj |, the resulting ßCD is smaller.
Claim 2. Suppose D has two kj , kj′ > |V |, j < j
′. Since each cycle in
the ßCD is simple, kj and kj′ are greater than both |βj | and |βj′ |; let us write
kj = b|βj′ |+ r with 0 ≤ r < |βj′ |, and similarly, kj′ = b
′|βj |+ r
′. We have:
D(j) · · ·D(j′) = βrj ·
(
(β
|βj′ |
j )
b · αj ·D(j + 1) · · ·D(j
′ − 1) · (β
|βj |
j′ )
b′
)
· βr
′
j′ · αj′ .
Noting that β
|βj|
j′ and β
|βj′ |
j are cycles of the same length, we can transfer all the
occurrences of one to the other, as in Claim 1. Similarly, if two simple paths get
merged and give rise to a cycle, a smaller ßCD can be constructed; if not, then
there are now at most r < |V | occurrences of βj′ (or conversely, r
′ of βj), again
resulting in a smaller ßCD. ⊓⊔
5 Short witnesses for regret, antagonistic, and
collaborative values
We continue our technical work towards our algorithm for computing the regret
value. In this section, the overarching theme is that of short witnesses. We show
that (1) The regret value of a strategy is witnessed by histories of bounded
length; (2) The collaborative value of a game is witnessed by a simple path and
an iterated cycle; (3) The antagonistic value of a strategy is witnessed by an
SCD and an iterated cycle.
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5.1 Regret is witnessed by histories of bounded length
Lemma 6. Let C = 2|V | + max{t(v) < ∞}. For any bipositional switching
strategy σ of Eve, we have:
Reg (σ) = max
{
λn
(
cValvn¬σ(h) − aVal
vn(σh)
) ∣∣∣
h = v0 . . . vn ∈ Hist(σ), n ≤ C
}
.
Proof. Consider a history h of length greater than C, and write h = h1 ·h2 with
|h1| = max{t(v) <∞}. Let h2 = p · p
′ where p is the maximal prefix of h2 such
that h1 · p is unswitched—we set p = ε if h is switched. Note that one of p or p
′
is longer than |V |—say p, the other case being similar. This implies that there
is a cycle in p, i.e., p = α ·β · γ with β a cycle. Let h′ = h1 ·α · γ · p
′; this history
has the same starting and ending vertex as h. Moreover, since |h1| is larger than
any value of the threshold function, σh = σh′ . Lastly, h
′ is still in Hist(σ), since
the removed cycle did not play a role in switching strategy. This shows:
cValvn¬σ(h) − aVal
vn(σh) = cVal
vn
¬σ(h′) − aVal
vn(σh′) .
Since the length of h is greater than the length of h′, the discounted value
for h′ will be greater than that of h, resulting in a bigger regret value. There is
thus no need to consider histories of size greater than C. ⊓⊔
It may seem from this lemma and the fact that t(v) may be very large that
we will need to guess histories of important length. However, since we will be
considering bipositional switching strategies, we will only be interested in some
properties of the histories that are not hard to verify:
Lemma 7. The following problem is decidable in NP:
Given: A game, a bipositional switching strategy σ,
a number n in binary, a Boolean b, and two vertices v, v′
Question: Is there a h ∈ Hist(σ) of length n, switched if b,
ending in v, with σ(h) = v′?
Proof. This is done by guessing multiple flows within the graph (V,E). Here, we
call flow a valuation of the edges E by integers, that describes the number of
times a path crosses each edge. Given a vector in NE , it is not hard to check that
there is a path that it represents, and to extract the initial and final vertices of
that path [17].
We first order the different thresholds from the strategy σ = σ1
t
→σ2: let
V∃ = {v1, v2, . . . , vk} with t(vi) ≤ t(vi+1) for all i. We analyze the structure of
histories consistent with σ. Let h ∈ Hist(σ), and write h = h′ · h′′ where h′ is
the maximal unswitched prefix of h. Naturally, h′ is consistent with σ1 and h
′′
is consistent with σ2. Then h
′ = h0h1 · · ·hi, for some i < |V∃|, with:
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– |h0| = t(v1) and for all 1 ≤ j < i, |hj | = t(vj+1)− t(vj);
– For all 0 ≤ j ≤ i, hj does not contain a vertex vk with k ≤ j.
To check the existence of a history with the given parameters, it is thus
sufficient to guess the value i ≤ |V∃|, and to guess i connected flows (rather than
paths) with the above properties that are consistent with σ1. Finally, we guess
a flow for h′′ consistent with σ2 if we need a switched history, and verify that
it is starting at a switching vertex. The flows must sum to n + 1, with the last
vertex being v′, and the previous v. ⊓⊔
5.2 Short witnesses for the collaborative and antagonistic values
Lemma 8. There is a set P of pairs (α, β) with α a simple path and β a simple
cycle such that:
cValv0 = max{Val(α · βω) | (α, β) ∈ P} .
Additionally, membership in P is decidable in polynomial time w.r.t. the game.
Proof. This is a consequence of Lemma 1: Consider positional SBO strategies
τ and σ of Adam and Eve, respectively. Since they are positional, the path
outv0(σ, τ) is of the form α · βω, as required, and its value is cValv0 .
Moreover, it can be easily checked that, given a pair (α, β), there exists a
pair of strategies with outcome α · βω. If that holds, the value Val(α · βω) will
be at most cValv0 . ⊓⊔
Lemma 9. Let σ be a bipositional switching strategy of Eve. There is a set K
of pairs (D, β) with D an SCD and β a simple cycle such that:
aValv0(σ) = min{Val(D(⋆) · βω) | (D, β) ∈ K} .
Additionally, the size of each pair is polynomially bounded, and membership in
K is decidable in polynomial time w.r.t. σ and the game.
Proof. Let C = max{t(v) < ∞}, and consider a play π consistent with σ that
achieves the value aValv0(σ). Write π = h · π′ with |h| = C, and let v be the
final vertex of h. Naturally:
aValv0(σ) = Val(π) = Val(h) + λ|h|Val(π′) .
We first show how to replace π′ by some α · βω , with α a simple path and
β a simple cycle. First, since π witnesses aValv0(σ), we have that Val(π′) =
aValv(σh). Now σh is positional, because |h| ≥ C.
4 It is known that there
are optimal positional antagonistic strategies τ for Adam, that is, that sat-
isfy aValv(σh) = out
v(σh, τ). As in the proof of Lemma 8, this implies that
aValv(σh) = Val(α · β
ω) = Val(π′) for some α and β; additionally, any (α, β)
4 Technically, σh is positional in the game where we record whether the switch was
made.
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that are consistent with σh and a potential strategy for Adam will give rise to a
bigger value.
We now argue that Val(h) is witnessed by an SCD of polynomial size. This
bears similarity to the proof of Lemma 7. Specifically, we will reuse the fact that
histories consistent with σ can be split into histories played “between thresh-
olds.”
Let us write σ = σ1
t
→σ2. Again, we let V∃ = {v1, v2, . . . , vk} with t(vi) ≤
t(vi+1) for all i and write h = h
′ · h′′ where h′ is the maximal unswitched prefix
of h. We note that h′ is consistent with σ1 and h
′′ is consistent with σ2. Then
h′ = h0h1 · · ·hi, for some i < |V∃|, with:
– |h0| = t(v1) and for all 1 ≤ j < i, |hj | = t(vj+1)− t(vj);
– For all 0 ≤ j ≤ i, hj does not contain a vertex vk with k ≤ j.
We now diverge from the proof of Lemma 7. We apply Lemma 5 on each hj
in the game where the strategy σ1 is hardcoded (that is, we first remove every
edge (u, v) ∈ V∃ × V that does not satisfy σ1(u) = v). We obtain a history
h′0h
′
1 · · ·h
′
i that is still in Hist(σ), thanks to the previous splitting of h. We also
apply Lemma 5 to h′, this time in the game where σ2 is hardcoded, obtaining h
′′.
Since each h′j and h
′′ are expressed as α ·βk ·γ, there is an SCD D with no more
than |V∃| elements that satisfies Val(D(⋆)) ≤ Val(h)—naturally, since Val(h)
is minimal and D(⋆) ∈ Hist(σ), this means that the two values are equal. Note
that it is not hard, given an SCD D, to check whether D(⋆) ∈ Hist(σ), and that
SCDs that are not valued Val(h) have a bigger value. ⊓⊔
6 The complexity of regret
We are finally equipped to present our algorithms. To account for the cost of
numerical analysis, we rely on the problem PosSLP [1]. This problem consists
in determining whether an arithmetic circuit with addition, subtraction, and
multiplication gates, together with input values, evaluate to a positive integer.
PosSLP is known to be decidable in the so-called counting hierarchy, itself
contained in the set of problems decidable using polynomial space.
Theorem 5. The following problem is decidable in NPPosSLP:
Given: A game, a bipositional switching strategy σ,
a value r ∈ Q in binary
Question: Is Reg (σ) > r?
Proof. Let us write σ = σ1
t
→σ2. Lemma 6 indicates that Reg (σ) > r holds if
there is a history h of some length n ≤ C = 2|V | +max{t(v) < ∞}, ending in
some vn such that:
λn
(
cValvn¬σ(h) − aVal
vn(σh)
)
> r . (1)
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Note that since σ is bipositional, we do not need to know everything about h.
Indeed, the following suffice: its length n, final vertex vn, v
′ = σ(h), and whether
it is switched. Rather than guessing h, we can thus rely on Lemma 7 to get the
required information. We start by simulating the NP machine that this lemma
provides, and verify that n, vn, and v are consistent with a potential history.
Let us now concentrate on the collaborative value that we need to evaluate
in Equation 1. To compute cVal, we rely on Lemma 8, which we apply in the
game where vn is set initial, and its successor forced not to be v. We guess a pair
(αc, βc) ∈ P ; we thus have Val(αc · β
ω
c ) ≤ cVal
vn
¬σ(h), with at least one guessed
pair (αc, βc) reaching that latter value.
Let us now focus on computing aValvn(σh). Since σ is a bipositional switch-
ing strategy, σh is simply σ where t(v) is changed to max{0, t(v)−n}. Lemma 9
can thus be used to compute our value. To do so, we guess a pair (D, βa) ∈ K;
we thus have Val(D(⋆) ·βωa ) ≥ aVal
vn(σh), and at least one pair (D, βa) reaches
that latter value.
Our guesses satisfy:
cValvn¬σ(h) − aVal
vn(σh) ≥ Val(αc · β
ω
c )−Val(D(⋆) · β
ω
a ) ,
and there is a choice of our guessed paths and SCD that gives exactly the left-
hand side. Comparing the left-hand side with r can be done using an oracle to
PosSLP (see Appendix, Section G), concluding the proof. ⊓⊔
Theorem 6. The following problem is decidable in coNPNP
PosSLP
:
Given: A game, a value r ∈ Q in binary
Question: Is Reg > r?
Proof. To decide the problem at hand, we ought to check that every strategy has
a regret value greater than r. However, optipess strategies being regret-minimal,
we need only check this for a class of strategies that contains optipess strategies:
bipositional switching strategies form one such class.
What is left to show is that optipess strategies can be encoded in polynomial
space. Naturally, the two positional strategies contained in an optipess strategy
can be encoded succinctly. We thus only need to show that, with t as in the
definition of optipess strategies (page 5), t(v) is at most exponential for every
v ∈ V∃ with t(v) ∈ N. This is shown in Appendix, Section H. ⊓⊔
Theorem 7. The following problem is decidable in coNPNP
PosSLP
:
Given: A game, a bipositional switching strategy σ
Question: Is σ regret optimal?
Proof. A consequence of the proof of Theorem 5 and the existence of optipess
strategies is that the value Reg of a game can be computed by a polynomial size
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arithmetic circuit. Moreover, our reliance on PosSLP allows the input r The-
orem 5 to be represented as an arithmetic circuit without impacting the com-
plexity. We can thus verify that for all bipositional switching strategies σ′ (with
sufficiently large threshold functions) and all possible polynomial size arithmetic
circuits, Reg(σ) > r implies that Reg(σ′) > r. The latter holds if and only if
σ is regret optimal since, as we have argued in the proof of Theorem 6, such
strategies σ′ include optipess strategies and thus regret-minimal strategies. ⊓⊔
7 Conclusion
We studied regret, a notion of interest for an agent that does not want to assume
that the environment she plays in is simply adversarial. We showed that there
are strategies that both minimize regret, and are not consistently worse than
any other strategies. The problem of computing the minimum regret value of a
game was then explored, and a better algorithm was provided for it.
The exact complexity of this problem remains however open. The only known
lower bound, a straightforward adaptation of [14, Lemma 3] for discounted-sum
games, shows that it is at least as hard as solving parity games [15]. Our upper
bound could be significantly improved if we could efficiently solve the following
problem:
Given: (ai)
n
i=1 ∈ Z
n, (bi)
n
i=1 ∈ N
n, and r ∈ Q all in binary,
Question: Is
∑n
i=1 ai · r
bi > 0?
The exact complexity of that problem seems to be open even for n = 3.
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A Incomparability of Admissible and Regret-Minimal
Strategies
Let 0 < λ < 1.
Consider the discounted-sum game depicted in Example 1. Let σ be the strat-
egy of Eve corresponding to the double edges. This strategy is not admissible:
it is dominated by the alternative strategy σ′ of Eve that behaves like σ from v1
but that chooses to go to v′2 from v2. Indeed, if τ is a strategy of Adam that goes
to v1, then the outcome plays of σ and σ
′ are the same, thus have the same value.
Now, if τ is a strategy of Adam that goes to v2, then the value of the outcome
play of σ and τ is 0, while the value of the outcome play of σ and τ is
∑∞
i=2 λ
i
which is strictly greater than 0. However, the strategy σ is regret-minimizing:
Recall that Reg (σ) = supτ supσ′ Val(out
v0(σ′, τ)) − Val(outv0(σ, τ)). If τ is
the strategy of Adam that goes to v2, then the maximal difference of values
between plays following σ and plays following alternative strategies is actually
attained with σ′, and is thus
∑∞
i=2 λ
i. Now, if Adam goes to v1, the maximal
difference of values between plays following σ and plays following alternative
strategies is
∑∞
i=1 2λ
i: if the strategy of Adam is such that it chooses to go to
y from v′1, and to x from v
′′
1 , playing σ yields a play value of 0, while going
to v′′1 yields a play value of
∑∞
i=2 2λ
i, which is strictly greater than
∑∞
i=2 λ
i,
since λ > 0. Thus, we have that Reg (σ) =
∑∞
i=2 2λ
i. Symmetrically, any strat-
egy that chooses to go to v′′1 from v1 also has a regret of
∑∞
i=2 2λ
i. Thus, the
strategy σ is regret-minimizing.
Consider now the discounted-sum game depicted in Example 2. Let σ be the
strategy of Eve corresponding to the double edges. This strategy is admissible:
In this game, Eve has only two available strategies: σ and the strategy σ′ that
goes to v1 from v0. It is easy to see that σ is not weakly dominated by σ
′. Indeed,
let us fix the strategy τ of Adam that goes to v′′1 from v1. Against σ, it yields a
play value of
∑∞
i=2 6λ
i, while against σ′, it yields a strictly smaller play value of∑∞
i=2 5λ
i. Hence, σ is not dominated by σ′, and is thus admissible. The strategy
σ is however not regret-minimizing. In fact, the strategy σ′ has a smaller regret.
Indeed, the regret of σ is the difference between the best possible outcome value
of σ′, which is
∑∞
i=2 10λ
i and its own only outcome value
∑∞
i=2 6λ
i, that is, a
regret of
∑∞
i=2 4λ
i. On the other hand, the regret of σ′ is the difference between
the best and only possible outcome value of σ, which is
∑∞
i=2 6λ
i and its own
worst possible outcome value
∑∞
i=2 5λ
i, that is, a regret of
∑∞
i=2 λ
i, which is
strictly less than
∑∞
i=2 4λ
i. Hence, the strategy σ is not regret-minimizing. Notice
that the strategy σ′ is in fact an optipess strategy (even though rather trivially).
B A proof of the existence of SBWO strategies
We prove the existence of positional SBWO strategies and their characterization
stated in Lemma 1.
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Proof. The characterization of SBWO strategies actually follows directly from
the characterization of SWO and SBO strategies also given by Lemma 1, and
from the definition of acVal. Below, we focus on the positionality claim.
From [20, Theorem 5.1] we know that for all u ∈ V∃ it holds that
aValu = max
(u,v)∈E
w(u, v) + λ · aValv.
Denote by A the game obtained by restricting G to the subset of edges E′ =
{(u, v) ∈ E | u ∈ V∃ =⇒ aVal
u = w(u, v) + λ · aValv}. It should be clear that
A characterizes the set of all SWO strategies, i.e. a strategy of Eve is SWO in
G if and only if it is a valid strategy in A. Moreover, by definition of acVal,
we have that a strategy of Eve in G is SBWO if and only if it is SBO in A.
To conclude, we recall that positional SBO strategies for Eve exist in A (see
Lemma 1, which follows from the corresponding Bellman optimality equations
for cVal given by [20, Theorem 5.1]). ⊓⊔
C Proof of Theorem 1
It is known that minimal-regret strategies always exist.
Lemma 10 (Follows from [13, Proposition 18]). For all games and all
initial vertices v0, there exists a strategy σ of Eve such that Reg (σ) = Reg.
The following upper bound on the “local regret” of strategies that are SWO
will be useful.
Lemma 11. For all v0 ∈ V∃ and for all SWO strategies σ from v0 we have that
λn
(
cValvn¬σ(h) − aVal
vn(σh)
)
≤ cValv0 − aValv0
for all histories h = v0 . . . vn.
Proof. We first observe that for all strategies σ′ of Eve and all histories h′ =
v′0 . . . v
′
m we have that aVal
h′(σ′) = aValh
′
if and only if aValv
′
m(σ′h′) = aVal
v′m .
Hence, for SWO strategies, the latter equality always holds.
The following inequalities yield the result.
cValv0 − aValv0
≥ cValv0 − (Val(h) + λnaValvn) def. of aValh
≥ (Val(h) + λncValvn)− (Val(h) + λnaValvn) def. of cValh
= λn (cValvn − aValvn)
= λn (cValvn − aValvn(σh)) by the argument above
≥ λn
(
cValvn¬σ(h) − aVal
vn(σh)
)
defs. of cValvn , cValvn¬σ(h)⊓⊔
Using the above lemma, it is straightforward to argue that Eve can switch
to follow an SWO strategy without increasing her regret.
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Lemma 12. Let σswo be a SWO strategy of Eve. For all strategies σ of Eve and
all v0 ∈ V , if we let
t(v) =
{
i ∈ N | λi (cValv − aValv) ≤ Reg (σ)
}
for all v ∈ V∃ then Reg (σ
′) ≤ Reg (σ) where σ′ = σ
t
→σswo.
Proof. Observe that a history consistent with σ′ is a switched history if and only
if it has a prefix v0 . . . vn ∈ Hist(σ
′) such that
λn (cValvn − aValvn) ≤ Reg (σ) . (2)
Let Sσ′ denote the maximal local regret incurred by switched histories consis-
tent with σ′ and U the maximal local regret incurred by all unswitched histories
(therefore consistent with both σ and σ′. More formally,
Sσ′ = sup
h′
λn
(
cValvn¬σswo(h′) − aVal
vn(σswoh′ )
)
with the supremum ranging over all switched histories h′ = v0 . . . vn ∈ Hist(σ
′).
Additionally,
U = sup
h′
λm
(
cVal
v′m
¬σ(h′) − aVal
v′m(σh′ )
)
with the supremum ranging over all unswitched histories h′ = . . . v′m ∈ Hist(σ)∩
Hist(σ′). From Lemma 2 and the definition of σ′ it follows that Reg (σ′) =
max(Sσ′ , U).
Now, consider the value
S0 = sup
h′
λn (cValvn − aValvn)
with the supremum ranging over all switched histories h′ = v0 . . . vn ∈ Hist(σ
′)
and such that no proper prefix of h′ is a switched history. (This indeed implies h′
is consistent with σ too.) From Lemma 11 we have that Sσ′ ≤ S0 and therefore
Reg (σ′) ≤ max(S0, U). Observe that, using Equation (2), we obtain that S0 ≤
Reg (σ). To conclude the proof it thus suffices to show that U ≤ Reg (σ).
However, it follows from Lemma 2 that Reg (σ) = max(Sσ, U) where Sσ denotes
the maximal local regret incurred by histories consistent with σ and such that
they have a prefix that is a switched history consistent with σ′. Hence, the claim
holds. ⊓⊔
The above result provides us with a way of simplifying regret-minimizing
strategies: For any v0 ∈ V and any strategy σ of Eve, there is a second strategy
σ′ of hers that follows σ as long as Equation 2 does not hold for the current
history. Otherwise, σ′ conclusively switches to a worst-case optimal strategy.
The following definition will be useful. We denote by cOpt(u) the set of all
best-case-optimal successors of u ∈ V∃, i.e.
cOpt(u)
def
= {v ∈ V | (u, v) ∈ E and cValu = cValuv}.
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Proof (of Theorem 1). Lemma 10 tells us that for all v0 ∈ V there exists a
strategy σ0 of Eve such that Reg (σ0) = Reg. Let σ
sbwo be a SBWO strategy
of Eve. From Lemma 12 we get that the strategy σ = σ0
t
→σsbwo, where for all
v ∈ V∃ we have
t(v) =
{
i ∈ N | λi (cValv − aValv) ≤ Reg
}
,
is also such that Reg (σ) = Reg. We will now argue that σ is an optipess
strategy. In fact, we will prove something slightly stronger: for all SBO strategies
σsbo of Eve, for all h = v0 . . . vn ∈ Hist(σ) such that h is an unswitched history,
we have that
1. |cOpt(vn)| = 1 and
2. σ(h) = σsbo(h).
Towards a contradiction, assume that this is not the case. That is, there exists
such an h for which |cOpt(vn)| > 1 or |cOpt(vn)| = 1 but σ(h) 6= σ
sbo(h)
for all SBO strategies σsbo of Eve. In the latter case, by Lemma 1, we must
have that σ(h) 6∈ cOpt(vn). It should be clear that in either case we have that
cValvn¬σ(h) = cVal
vn . We thus have that
λ−nReg (σ) ≥ cValvn¬σ(h) − aVal
vn(σh) by Lemma 2
= cValvn − aValvn(σh) see arguments above
≥ cValvn − aValvn by definition of aVal.
By assumption, we have that h is an unswitched history and therefore
λn (cValvn − aValvn) > Reg.
The above inequalities thus imply that the regret of σ is strictly larger than
Reg, which is a contradiction. ⊓⊔
D Proof of Theorem 2
Proof (of Theorem 2). Let σ be a strategy of Eve and D be the set of histories h
such that the sequence of inequalities aValh(σ) ≤ cValh(σ) ≤ aValh ≤ acValh
holds with at least one inequality being strict. Denote by sp(D) be the (possibly
infinite) subset of D that contains all the shortest prefixes of the histories in D,
that is
sp(D)
def
= {h ∈ D | ∀h′ ∈ D \ {h} : h′ 6⊆pref h}
We now define a strategy σ′ for all histories h = v0 . . . vn such that vn ∈ V∃
as follows
σ′(h) =
{
σsbwoh′ (h) if there exists h
′ ∈ sp(D) such that h′ ⊆pref h
σ(h) otherwise.
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(Note that σ′ is well-defined as all the elements in sp(D) are incomparable.)
Intuitively, the strategy σ′ follows σ until the above sequence of inequalities
holds — which, essentially, means that one can do better than σ from that point
onward. Then, σ′ switches to follow an SBWO strategy forever.
We first show that σ is weakly dominated by σ′. To do so, we will compare
σ and σ′ with regard to the strategies of Adam. Let τ be a strategy of Adam.
Let π be the outcome play of σ and τ , and π′ the one of σ′ and τ . If π =
π′, then clearly Val(π) = Val(π′). Otherwise, if π 6= π′, they share a longest
common prefix h = v0 . . . vn. As τ is fixed, we know that vn ∈ V∃ and that
σ(h) 6= σ′(h). By definition of σ′, it means that there exists a prefix h′ of h
such that h′ ∈ sp(D). Thus, we have that cValh
′
(σ) ≤ aValh
′
and consequently
Val(π) ≤ aValh
′
. On the other hand, from h′ we know that σ′ behaves like
σsbwoh′ , thus, Val(π
′) ≥ aValh
′
. Hence, Val(π) ≤ Val(π′). This is true for any
strategy of Adam, thus σ is indeed weakly dominated by σ′.
We now show that σ′ is admissible. Towards this, we use the character-
ization from Lemma 3: A strategy σ of Eve is admissible if and only if for
every history h ∈ Hist(σ) the following holds: either cValh(σ) > aValh or
aValh(σ) = cValh(σ) = aValh = acValh. Let h = v0 . . . vn be a history consis-
tent with σ′ such that vn ∈ V∃.
– Assume first that there exists a prefix h′ of h that belongs to sp(D). In that
case, we know that σ′ behaves like σsbwoh′ from h, thus we have aVal
h(σ′) =
aValh and cValh(σ′) = acValh, by definition of SBWO strategies. If
acValh > aValh,
then σ′ satisfies the first part of the characterization. Otherwise, acValh =
aValh, the second part of the characterization is satisfied, as we obtain
immediately aValh(σ′) = cValh(σ′) = aValh = acValh.
– Assume now that h has no prefix that belongs to sp(D). By definition of
σ′, this means that σ′(h′) = σ(h) for all prefixes h′ ⊆pref h. In other terms,
σ and σ′ agree (at least) up to h. Let hπ be an outcome consistent with σ
such that Val(hπ) = cValh(σ) (which exists because discounted-sum games
are well-formed). Let τ be a strategy of Adam such that πv0στ = hπ (which
exists because hπ is consistent with σ). Since σ and σ′ agree up to h, there
exists π′ be such that hπ′ = πv0σ′τ . Recall that σ is weakly dominated by
σ′. As τ is fixed, we know that Val(hπ) ≤ Val(hπ′). Thus, we have that
cValh(σ′) ≥ Val(hπ′) ≥ Val(hπ) = cValh(σ).
Recall now that by definition of sp(D), we know that in particular, it either
holds that
(A) cValh(σ) > aValh
or
(B) aValh(σ) = cValh(σ) = aValh = acValh.
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Suppose (A) holds. We thus have that cValh(σ′) ≥ cValh(σ) > aValh, that
is, cValh(σ′) > aValh. This means that σ′ satisfies the first part of the
characterization.
Finally, suppose that (B) holds. We have
cValh(σ′) ≥ Val(hπ′) ≥ Val(hπ)
= cValh(σ) = aValh(σ) = aValh = acValh,
and thus cValh(σ′) ≥ acValh . Furthermore, we also know that aValh(σ′) ≥
aValh(σ). As by definition of the antagonistic value, we have aValh(σ′) ≤
aValh and aValh(σ) = aValh, we obtain aValh(σ′) = aValh. We now know
that σ′ is worst-case optimal at h. By definition of acValh, we can conclude
that cValh(σ′) ≤ acValh. Since it is also true that cValh(σ′) ≥ acValh, we
obtain aValh(σ′) = cValh(σ′) = aValh = acValh, that is, σ′ satisfies the
second part of the characterization.
Thus, the strategy σ′ is admissible. ⊓⊔
E On the well-formedness of discounted-sum games
In [6], the authors introduce the notion of well-formed games, that is, games
where, for each player, and each history, there exist strategies witnessing the
antagonistic and collaborative values at this history. They then show that, in
such games, admissible strategies can be characterized in terms of values at any
history consistent with the strategy (see Lemma 3). It is worth noticing that for
any player, it is in fact sufficient that this player has witnessing strategies for the
antagonistic and collaborative values at any history. We call this property well-
formedness for a player. In our context, we focus on the strategies and payoffs
of Eve, thus we phrase the statement as follows:
A game is well-formed for Eve if, for all h ∈ Hist:
1. there exists a strategy σ of Eve such that aValh(σ) = aValh.
2. there exists a strategy σ of Eve such that cValh(σ) = cValh.
Lemma 13. Discounted-sum games are well-formed for Eve.
Proof. This can be seen as a direct implication of Lemma 1: Indeed, the SWO
and SBWO strategies are good witnesses for conditions 1 and 2, respectively. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3 then directly follows from [6, Theorem 11].
Note that well-formedness for Eve, in general, does not guarantee the exis-
tence of a play that witnesses the collaborative value at any history. However,
in discounted-sum games, this is indeed the case. In the proof of Theorem 4, we
use the fact that there exists a play consistent with σsbo that has such value,
thus also a strategy τ of Adam such that the outcome of σsbo and τ is exactly
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this play. The argument relies on the fact that discounted-sum value functions
are continuous. We recall a few useful notions before proving the property.
Considering a discounted-sum game G = (V, v0, V∃, E, w, λ). The set V is en-
dowed with the discrete topology, and thus the set V ω with the product topology.
Then, a sequence of plays (πn)n∈N is said to converge to a play π = limn→∞ πn, if
every prefix of π is a prefix of all but finitely many of the πn. It is well known that
the discounted-sum value function is continuous, that is, whenever a sequence
of plays (πn)n∈N converges to a play π, we have limn→∞Val(πn) = Val(π).
Lemma 14. For any history h = v0 . . . vn consistent with σ
sbo, there exists a
strategy τ of Adam such that h ⊆pref out
v0(σsbo, τ) and Val(outv0(σsbo, τ)) =
cValh.
Proof. From Lemma 1, we know that cValh(σsbo) = cValh. Thus, we have, by
definition of the collaborative value, that
cValh = Val(h) + λ|h| · sup
τ
Val(outvn(σsboh , τ)).
As σsbo is positional, we have σsboh = σ
sbo, thus we can write
cValh = Val(h) + λ|h| · sup
τ
Val(outvn(σsbo, τ)).
Let d
def
= supτ Val(out
vn(σsbo, τ)). We first show that there exists τ ′ such that
Val(outvn(σsbo, τ ′)) = d.
Since d = supτ Val(out
vn(σsbo, τ)), we know that there exists a sequence
(πn)n∈N of outcomes consistent with σ
sbo such that lim supn→∞Val(πn) =
d. Since the discounted-sum value function is continuous, we also have that
limn→∞Val(πn) = d.
Suppose the sequence (πn)n∈N eventually stabilizes, that is, there exists N
such that πn = πN for every n > N . We have that limn→∞Val(πn) = Val(πN ),
thus Val(πN ) = d. Let τ
′ be a strategy of Adam such that outvn(σsbo, τ ′) =
πN (which exists since πN is a valid outcome in G). We indeed obtain that
Val(outvn(σsbo, τ ′)) = d.
Suppose now the sequence (πn)n∈N does not eventually stabilize, that is,
for all n, there exists N > n such that πN 6= πn. We construct, iteratively, a
subsequence (π′k)k∈N from (πn)n∈N as follows: We start by fixing π
′
0 = π0. Recall
that V is a finite set. Let m be its size, we can label the vertices v0, . . . , vm−1,
with v0 = v0. Let P0
def
= {πn | n ∈ N}. We partition the set of all πn according
to their prefixes of length 2: For every 0 ≤ i < m, we define P i1
def
= {πn | n ∈
N, v0v
i ⊆pref πn}. As V is finite and the set of outcomes in the sequence is
infinite, there exists i such that the set P i1 is infinite as well. We fix P1 to be
such an infinite P i1. Let π ∈ P1. We fix π
′
1 = π.
Suppose now that π′0 to π
′
k are already determined, as well as the infinite
sets P0 to Pk, and that v0 . . . v
′
k is the prefix of length k + 1 of π
′
k. For every
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0 ≤ i < m, we define P ik+1
def
= {πn | πn ∈ Pk, v0 . . . v
′
kv
i ⊆pref πn}. Again, as V
is finite and the set Pk is infinite, there exists i such that the set P
i
k+1 is infinite
as well. Let Pk+1
def
= P ik+1. Let π ∈ Pk+1. We fix π
′
k+1 = π.
The subsequence (π′k)k∈N is now well defined and has the following property:
for each N ∈ N, each prefix hN of length N + 1 of π
′
N , and k ≥ N , we have
hN ⊆pref π
′
k. Let π be the outcome such that hN ⊆pref π for all N ∈ N (this
outcome is well defined as hN ⊆pref hN+1 for all N ∈ N). By construction of
π, we have that limk→∞ π
′
k = π. As (π
′
k)k∈N is a subsequence of (πn)n∈N, the
sequence (Val(π′k))k∈N is a subsequence of (Val(πn))n∈N, hence:
lim
k→∞
Val(π′k) = lim
n→∞
Val(πn) = d.
Since the discounted-sum value function is continuous, we also haveVal(π) =
limk→∞Val(π
′
k). Thus we get Val(π) = d. Let τ
′ be a strategy of Adam such
that outvn(σsbo, τ ′) = π (which exists since π is a valid outcome in G). We
indeed obtain that Val(outvn(σsbo, τ ′)) = d.
We now conclude the proof by exhibiting τ such that Val(outv0(σsbo, τ)) =
cValh: We already know that h is consistent with σsbo. This means in particular
that there exists a strategy τ ′′ of Adam such that h ⊆pref out
v0(σsbo, τ ′′). Let
now τ be the strategy of Adam such that:
τ(h′)
def
=
{
τ ′(h′) if h ⊆pref h
′,
τ ′′(h′) otherwise.
It is easy to see that outv0(σsbo, τ) = hπ. Finally, Val(hπ) = Val(h) + λ|h| ·
Val(π) = Val(h) + λ|h| · d = supτ Val(out
vn(σsbo, τ)) = cValh. ⊓⊔
F Proof of Lemma 4
Proof (of Lemma 4). We will suppose that neither inequality holds and derive
a contradiction.
Let k and ℓ be the lengths of α, γ and β, respectively. On the one hand, we
have that Val(α2 · β) > Val(P ). This is equivalent to the following.
Val(α2) + λ2kVal(β) > Val(α) + λkVal(β) + λk+ℓVal(γ)
⇐⇒ λkVal(α) + λ2kVal(β) > λkVal(β) + λk+ℓVal(γ)
⇐⇒ Val(α) + λkVal(β) > Val(β) + λℓVal(γ)
⇐⇒ Val(α) > (1− λk)Val(β) + λℓVal(γ). (3)
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On the other hand, we have that Val(β · γ2) > Val(P ). The latter holds if and
only if the following does.
Val(β) + λℓVal(γ)2 > Val(α) + λkVal(β) + λk+ℓVal(γ)
⇐⇒ (1− λk)Val(β) + λℓVal(γ2) > Val(α) + λk+ℓVal(γ)
⇐⇒ (1− λk)Val(β) + λℓVal(γ) + λk+ℓVal(γ) > Val(α) + λk+ℓVal(γ)
⇐⇒ (1− λk)Val(β) + λℓVal(γ) > Val(α).
The last inequality is already in clear contradiction with Inequality 3. ⊓⊔
G Representing and comparing long-history values
Presently, we provide a brief discussion on succinctly encoded (rational) num-
bers. In this work we have assumed that all weights labeling edges in our game
are given as binary-encoded numbers. The discount factor, λ, we also assume is
given in binary. That is, λ is given as a pair of binary-encoded natural numbers
p, q ∈ N such that q > 0 and p/q = λ. In Section 6 we deal with numbers that
seemingly do not admit such classical representations.
Besides encoding a number in binary, one can also consider polynomials (and
a binary-encoded valuation of its variables), or arithmetic circuits as represen-
tations for numbers (see, e.g., [4]). A number P = ae1n + · · ·+ a
en
n where ai ∈ Z
and ei ∈ N for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, for instance, may be such that P (a, e) ≥ 2
2n while
being representable with a list of binary-encoded numbers using at most n2 bits.
An arithmetic circuit is an even more succinct representation. Formally, such a
circuit is a rooted directed acyclic graph whose internal nodes are labelled with
operations from {+,−,×} and whose leaves are labelled with binary-encoded
integers. Determining whether a number given as an arithmetic circuit is posi-
tive is known as the PosSLP problem and has been shown to be decidable in
the fourth level of the counting hierarchy by Allender et al. [1].
In this work, because of the discount factor, when writing formulas for the
discounted-sum value of long histories, we may in fact need to use division.
Concretely, to determine whether the value of a history is positive one may
write down the following inequality
m∑
i=1
(
p
q
)ei (ai
bi
)
> 0
where bi, ei ∈ N, qi > 0, and ai ∈ Z for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. However, we can remove
this limited use of division by doing the following. Let E
def
= max{ei | 1 ≤ i ≤ m}
and Bi
def
=
∏
{bj | 1 ≤ j ≤ m, j 6= i}. Then the above inequality holds if and
only if the following holds
m∑
i=1
Bibip
eiqE−ei > 0.
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In the context of this work, the main application of the arithmetic-circuit-
encoding discussed here is to express the discounted-sum value of a long history
α · βk · γ as follows
Val(α · βk · γ) = Val(α) + λ|α|
Val(β)
1− λ|β|
(1− λ|β|k) + λ|α|+|β|kVal(γ)
Note that while Val(α), Val(β), and Val(γ) can be represented using binary
rationals, this is not the case for λ|β|k in general.
H Upper-bounding t(v) for optipess strategies
We will now prove the following bound on the finite values of the threshold
function for optipess strategies:
Lemma 15. For all optipess strategies σ of Eve with threshold function t we
have that t(v) is at most exponential for all v ∈ V∃ with t(v) ∈ N.
Let us fix a value for the size of a game with discount factor λ = p/q. Define
|G|
def
= |V |+ |E|+ ⌈log2 p⌉+ ⌈log2 q⌉+
∑
(u,v)∈E
⌈log2 w(u, v)⌉.
H.1 A lower bound on the regret of a game.
In [13] the following lower bound on the regret of games with non-zero regret
was given.
Lemma 16 (From [13, Corollary 12]). For all v0 ∈ V we have that if Reg >
0 then
Reg ≥ min
{
λ|V | (cValv − aValv)
∣∣∣ v ∈ V∃, cValv > aValv} .
Using the existence of positional optimal strategies in discounted-sum games
(see Lemma 1) it is straightforwards to show the antagonistic and collaborative
values are always realized by a simple lasso. That is, a play α · γω where α is a
simple path and γ is a simple cycle. It follows that both values are representable
using binary-number pairs that use polynomially-many bits.
Lemma 17. There exists a polynomial P such that for all v ∈ V we have that
– aValv = a/b, cValv = c/d, and
– ⌈log2 |a|⌉, ⌈log2 |c|⌉, ⌈log2 b⌉, ⌈log2 d⌉ ∈ O(P (|G|))
for some a, c ∈ Z and b, d ∈ N>0.
As an immediate consequence of the above lemmas we get the following lower
bound on non-zero regret values.
Proposition 1. There exists a polynomial P such that for all v0 ∈ V we have
that if Reg > 0 then Reg ≥ 2−P (|G|).
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H.2 An upper bound on the finite thresholds of an optipess strategy
We first note that, for all v ∈ V∃, if cVal
v = aValv then t(v) = 0 and if Reg = 0
then t(v) =∞. Hence, it suffices to bound the threshold function for all v ∈ V∃
such that cValv > aValv when Reg > 0. In the sequel we focus on an arbitrary
vertex v ∈ V∃ and make the assumption that those two inequalities hold.
Observe that for all v ∈ V and all i, r ∈ Q≥0 we have that
λi (cValv − aValv) = r
if and only if i log2 λ = log2 r − log2 (cVal
v − aValv) if and only if
i =
log2 r − log2 (cVal
v − aValv)
log2 λ
=
log2 (cVal
v − aValv)− log2 r
log2 (λ
−1)
.
Let wmax
def
= max(u,u′) |w(u, u
′)|. It is easy to see that
−wmax
1− λ
≤ aValv ≤ cValv ≤
wmax
1− λ
for all v ∈ V . From the above arguments we therefore get that for all v0 ∈ V the
following hold
t(v) = inf {n ∈ N | λn (cValv − aValv) ≤ Reg}
= min {n ∈ N | λn (cValv − aValv) ≤ Reg}
≤
log2(cVal
v − aValv)− log2Reg
log2 (λ
−1)
≤
log2
(
2wmax
1−λ
)
+ P (|G|)
log2 (λ
−1)
≤
log2(2) + log2 wmax − log2(1− λ) + P (|G|)
log2 (λ
−1)
≤
1 + log2 wmax + log2
(
q
q−p
)
+ P (|G|)
log2(q/p)
≤
1 + log2 wmax + log2(q) + P (|G|)
log2(q/p)
≤
P (|G|) + 2|G|+ 1
log2(q/p)
where λ = p/q and P is the polynomial from Proposition 1.
To complete the proof of the claim, it suffices to argue that 1/ log2 (q/p)
grows at most exponentially in the size of G. It should be clear that 1/ log2 (q/p)
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is maximized when q/p approaches one and that therefore an exponential bound
for 1/ log2
(
1 + 2−|G|
)
implies the desired result. Finally, it is easy to verify that
lim
x→∞
1
log
2
(1+2−x)
2x2
= 0,
which implies
1
log2
(
1 + 2−|G|
) ∈ O (2|G|2) =⇒ t(v) ∈ O (2|G|2(P (|G|) + 2|G|+ 1))
thus completing the proof. ⊓⊔
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